

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12

TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-10 INRE-00 AEC-11

AECE-00 IO-12 OIC-04 OMB-01 ACDA-19 RSR-01 /153 W

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P R 051250 Z APR 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9629

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2845

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 1687

E. O. 11652: GDS 12/31/79

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: NAC DISCUSSION OF MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES,
APRIL 4

HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING RESUMED AFTERNOON SESSION APRIL 4 NAC
MEETING, BELGIAN, GERMAN, AND UK PERMREP SUGGESTED POSTPONEMENT
OF NAC DISCUSSION OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES UNTIL US POSITION WAS
PRESENTED. DURING SHARP EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT,
NETHERLANDS AND ITALIANS PERMREPS ARGUED FOR EARLY NAC DISCUSSION
WITHOUT WAITING FOR US POSITION. BELGIAN AND NETHERLANDS PERMREPS
PRESSED US FOR A DEADLINE FOR PRESENTING ITS POSITION.
UK PERMREP SUGGESTED OTHER TASKS WHICH COULD USEFULLY BE UNDER-
TAKEN. CONSENSUS WAS THAT NAC WOULD RETURN TO SUBJECT IN
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TWO WEEKS TIME. IN THE MEANTIME, UK SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE
PURSUED, END SUMMARY.

1. ACTING SYG PANSA REVIEWED BACKGROUND IF SYG'S PAPER (PO/73/13) AND UNDERSTANDING THAT US WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN DISCUSSION. HE WAS CERTAIN THAT NAC WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO REACH CONCLUSIONS NOW AND URGED GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE STUDIES AVAILABLE TO NATO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. DE STEARCKE (BELGIUM) HAD ONE QUESTION: WHEN WOULD THE US POSITION BE AVAILABLE?

3. RUMSFELD (US) SAID HE HAD NO NEW INFORMATION TO PRESENT; THAT HE EXPECTED IT IN LATE APRIL OR SOMETIME IN MAY; THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO MAKE A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT; AND, THAT IF THE STUDY WAS NOT READY, IT COULD NOT BE PRESENTED. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT EFFECT LACK OF PROGRESS IN VIENNA MIGHT HAVE HAD ON WASHINGTON TIMETABLE, BUT IT HAD NOT ACCELERATED IT.

4. DE STEARCKE THOUGHT THAT THE POSITION OF THE US WAS FUNDAMENTAL AND THAT THE NAC SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE ISSUES AT HAND UNTIL THE US POSITION WAS AVAILABLE. HE LIKENED EARLIER DISCUSSION TO "ALL SHIPS LEAVING PORT EXCEPT THE FLAGSHIP" AND BELIEVED THAT NAC SHOULD WAIT THE 3-4 WEEKS NECESSARY IN HOPE THAT THE US COULD PARTICIPATE. RUMSFELD CONCURRED AND REMINDED NAC THAT HE HAD ON SEVERAL PREVIOUS OCCASIONS EXPRESSED STRONG FEELING THAT CURRENT MEETING SHOULD NOT BE HELD.

5. KRAPF (FRG) WAS SYMPATHETIC TO US POSITION AND THOUGHT NAC SHOULD WAIT UNTIL US POSITION WAS AVAILABLE.

6. PECK (UK) CONCURRED WITH US AND FRG. IN THE MEANTIME, HE SUGGESTED SEVERAL UNDERTAKINGS: THE SECRETARIAT MIGHT CROSS REFERENCE THE ISSUES IN PO/73/13 WITH OTHER EXISTING NATO STUDIES;

THERE COULD BE POLITICAL SCRUTINY OF MILITARY ANALYSES; THE NAC COULD REVIEW THE ALLIES' METHOD AND MECHANISM FOR CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS AND TRY TO STREAMLINE THEM; NATO COULD TRY TO ANALYZE THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS LIKELY TO BE TAKEN IN NEGOTIATIONS BY THE WARSAW PACT ON VARIOUS
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ISSUES; AND, NATO COULD TRY TO SMOKE OUT PACT MILITARY INTENTIONS AND PACT'S WILLINGNESS TO RESPECT ANY AGREEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE REACHED.

7. SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS) WAS READY TO SPEAK TO ISSUES IN PO/73/13 BUT WANTED TO PUT ON RECORD THAT HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT AGREE WITH WHAT HAD BEEN SAID. AS HE SAW IT, TIME WOULD RUN OUT; FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS WOULD BE PRESENTED A PAPER THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND; JUNE MINISTERIAL WOULD THEREFORE

TAKE NO ACTION; THE MONTH OF AUGUST WOULD ARRIVE; NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN IN SEPTEMBER AND NATO WOULD BE UNPREPARED. HE THOUGHT POSITION OF US, FRG, BELGIUM AND UK WAS A MISTAKE. THE RESPONSIBILITY, HE SAID, IS YOURS, NOT MINE.

8. DE STEARCKE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS PO, AS WAS CATALANO (ITALY) WHO VENTURED SUGGESTION THAT NAC CONSIDER PO PIECEMEAL AND THAT US COULD PROVIDE PIECEMEAL POSITION.

9. PANSA BELIEVED THAT APPROACH WAS NOT REALISTIC. ANY REDCUTION OF FORCES WOULD HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON US FORCES IN EUROPE. HE BELIEVED CONSENSUS WAS A RELUCTANT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE POINT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL FOR NAC TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITHOUT IS PARTICIPATION AND THAT SUCH DISCUSSION SHOULD BE DELAYED. HE NOTED SHORTAGE OF TIME BEFORE MINISTERIAL, HOWEVER, HE ASKED IF US COULD MAKE PIECEMEAL CONTRINUTIONS OR PROMISE A DEADLINE FOR PRESENTING ITS STUDY. RUMSFELD SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW A PIECEMEAL CONTRINUTION WAS SIMPLY NOT PRACTICAL; THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER MBFR WAS THE TYPE OF SUBJECT THAT COULD BE READILY DISSECTED; THAT WHEN THE PAPER WAS DONE IT WOULD BE PRESENTED; AND HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE A DEADLINE. HE SAW NO REASON WHY OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT CONTINUE THEIR STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF MBFR IN THE MEANTIME. KRAPF CONCURRED THAT A PIECEMEAL APPROACH WAS NOT POSSIBLE.

10. SPIERENBURG PRESSED HARD AND WAS CRITICAL OF WAITING FOR US POSITION AND THOUGHT WASHINGTON MIGHT BOT BE AWARE OF ALLIED INTEREST IN RECEING IT. RUMSFELD ASSURED HIM WASHINGTON WAS AWARE. SPIERENBURG SUGGESTED PROCEEDING ALONG LINES OF A PIECEMEAL APPROACH. CATALANO CONCURRED.

11. PANSA, SUMMING UP, SAID THAT NAC COULD DISCUSS PO AGAIN IN TWO WEEKS TIME WHEN SOME INFORMATION FROM WASHINGTON MAY BE AVAIL-
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ABLE. IN THE MEANTIME, HE SUGGESTED, IF OTHERS AGREED, PROCEEDING ALONG LINES OF PECK' S SUGGESTIONS. NONE DISAGREED.

12. COMMENT: BRITISH AND GERMANS WERE HELPFUL ON THIS OCCASION IN REACHING CONSENSUS FOR DEFERRAL. HOWEVER, THE DISCUSSION AT THIS NAC, AND EVEN MORE IN SUBSEQUENT CORRIDOR CONVERSATION, LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT THE ISSUE IS BY NO MEANS TRANQUILLED. THERE REMAINS GENUINE CONCERN ON THE PART OF SMALLER COUNTRIES THAT THERE WILL BE INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR ALLIES' VIEWS TO BE REGISTERED AND CONSIDERED BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IMMINENT. BRITISH AND GERMANS MAY WELL EXPRESS SIMILAR CONCERN AFTER BRITISH VISIT WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK ANDTHEY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE NOTES WITH FRG AND FINALIZE THEIR TWN POSITIONS. ACCORDINGLY, MISSION RECOMMENDS THAT U. S. PAPER BE MADE AVAILABLE HERE LATE APRIL AS INDICATED STATE 53784. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT JUNE MINISTERIAL WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PRODUCE MUCH IN THE WAY OF AGREED

GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATORS, BUT ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE IN POSITION TO
FAULT U. S. FOR LATE SUBMISSION OF CRITICAL INPUT WHICH WOULD UNDER-
CUT U. S. EFFORTS TO PRESS FOR MAXIMUM AGREEMENT POSSIBLE IN JUNE.
IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN NEGOTIATING SCHEDULE WASHINGTON ENVISAGES,
AND IF MBFR IS TO REMAIN GENUINELY MULTILATERAL EFFORT, TIMELY
SUBMISSION WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO FORMULATION OF AGREED ALLIANCE
POSITION ON THESE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. OUR CHOICE OTHERWISE
WILL LIE BETWEEN POSTPONEMENT AND DISARRAY. END COMMENT.
RUMSFELD

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 APR 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO01687
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730458/abqcdygw.tel
Line Count: 174
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <17-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: NAC DISCUSSION OF MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES, APRIL 4
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
HELSINKI
MOSCOW
VIENNA

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005